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Performed Being:
Word Art as a Human Inheritance
Frederick Turner
The study of the oral tradition presently lies at the crossroads of 
several new lines of research that promise to transform the shape of literary 
criticism and critical theory forever. The nature of this change may perhaps 
be indicated by an analogy with the revolution in the study of biology which 
was wrought by the theory of evolution.
Before Darwin and Wallace proposed the mechanism of natural 
selection, biology was essentially disconnected from the other sciences of 
the physical world. Various strategies or approaches existed for the pursuit 
of biological studies: the descriptive (corresponding to the common or 
“garden-variety” descriptive criticism one fi nds in the standard surveys 
of literature), the taxonomic (corresponding to classical genre study), the 
functional (corresponding to the study of rhetoric and reader response), the 
developmental (corresponding to biographical and historical criticism), the 
anatomical (corresponding to the New Criticism and Structuralism), the 
mystical/vitalist (corresponding to Deconstructionism), and the ecological 
(corresponding to “infl uence” criticism). But no single principle unifi ed these 
strategies; no way of relating living matter to other forms of organization 
existed; no concrete connection appeared between higher and lower forms 
of life; and no opportunity was offered for the use of mathematical models 
on one hand and experimental analysis on the other, though these tools had 
proved extremely powerful in understanding less complex physical entities 
such as planetary motions and chemical compounds.
The evolutionary perspective, however, provided a single underlying 
principle uniting all branches of biological science. It
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opened the way for the development of biochemistry, which links nonliving 
with living matter and derives the latter from the former. It showed how 
the higher forms of life derived from the lower. It spawned population 
genetics and the elegant statistical mathematics of gene pool models. And 
it not only provided a starting point for biological experimentation, but 
also demonstrated that many “experiments” already existed in the form of 
isolated evolving ecosystems like the Galapagos Islands, or in the selective 
breeding of domesticated species. Above all, evolutionary theory provided 
the biological phenomena of the present moment with a deep history, so that 
their signifi cance sprang suddenly into three-dimensional clarity. The result 
of these changes was to transform biology–as a discipline–from a hobby of 
gentleman scholars to a central and vital element of public life and cultural 
development.
Would it not be a worthy goal for the literary scholar to seek an 
equivalent unifying idea? The various schools of critical theory and practice 
all have their successes, but taken together their differences cloud rather 
than sharpen the student’s vision; we have no theory of the relation between 
literature and the other arts, and those human activities such as religion and 
politics; we have little coherent idea of the connections between “high” 
literature and folk and popular literature; we have not seriously studied how 
literature might be understood in terms of the organs which produce and 
appreciate it, the linguistic and auditory systems of the brain; and we have no 
way of constructing genuine literary experiments, because we have no basic 
language for asking the questions experiments are designed to answer. (A 
merely random reshuffl ing of linguistic elements, which characterizes much 
modern “experimental” literature, is not, for this reason, truly experimental 
at all.) We do not know what existed before literature that made literature 
come to be possible, and thus cannot recognize the relationship between its 
archaic “grammar” and its expressive novelty. Literary study remains the 
mandarin pursuit of a leisured minority, despite the pervasive importance of 
the arts of words in the lives of all human beings.
Even the analogy of a unifying paradigm in natural science is 
productive, in that it suggests requirements for a working body of knowledge 
that have been neither exacted nor met in literary criticism. Perhaps, indeed, 
the analogy should not be taken too far. Literary criticism is a fi eld of 
humane studies, not a science.
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But to the extent that the achievements of evolutionary theory in biology 
provided that discipline with the humblest commonsense rational virtues–
consistency, unity of language, fertility of hypothesis, clear criteria of 
signifi cance–the stricture implicit in the analogy should not be rejected. 
Perhaps literary criticism should never be an exact quantifi ed science. But 
then, neither should biology: life, after all, is itself a survival strategy of 
fi nesse against the cold numbers of entropy, complexifying the molecular 
game, raising the stakes, delaying the payment of physical debt, changing the 
rules so as to keep ahead of the literalistic determinism of thermodynamics. 
Evolutionary theory did not falsify by reduction the complex and qualitative 
richness of the biosphere: rather, it helped us to reveal it.
Several characteristics qualify the oral tradition to be the Galapagos 
Islands,1 so to speak, where a unifying literary theory may begin to take 
shape. First, its antiquity: the roots of oral tradition reach back as far as 
our scholarship can trace. Second, its association with ritual, a kind of 
behavior which we share, in part, with other animals and which appears 
to be fundamental to human nature. Third, its association, in practice, with 
pleasure, on which there is now an increasing body of neurophysiological 
research. Fourth, its use of psychic technologies such as rhythmic driving and 
mnemonics. Fifth, its cultural universality, which points to a shared human 
inheritance. Sixth, its nature as a tradition of performance: an activity now 
increasingly recognized as having its own rules and structures, which may 
in turn cast light on the literary arts in general. Seventh, its complex and 
profound involvement with speech acts and performative utterances, forms 
of language which linguistic philosophy has recently begun to explore and 
which are in turn connected to the most fundamental questions of truth, 
reality, and being.
The oral tradition is the one branch of literary studies which 
reaches back far enough in time to invite a consideration of that crucial 
period in human prehistory when biological evolution overlapped with 
cultural evolution. During this epoch the physiological adaptations which 
produced modern Homo Sapiens were not complete; but according to 
paleoanthropology, there is unmistakable evidence that quite complex 
behaviors, including speech, were already in place and in process of further 
development. The length of this period is a matter of vigorous controversy 
among anthropologists, archaeologists, and human
 WORD ART AS A HUMAN INHERITANCE 69
ethologists. The shortest estimates, however, are in at least hundreds of 
thousands of years; many authorities would say millions.2 A large proportion 
of those physical characteristics which are uniquely human and which mark 
us off from the other primates evolved during that period of overlap; and–
most signifi cantly of all, though the natural divisions between subdisciplines 
have obscured it until recently–those human characteristics of body and 
brain must have evolved under the strong infl uence and selective pressure 
of the earliest forms of culture. In other words, the human brain and body 
are at least as much the product of human culture as human culture is the 
product of the human body and brain! We are a domesticated species–self-
domesticated, or, better still, domesticated by culture even before we had 
what we might truly call a human self. There was ample time for cultural 
requirements to become genetically embodied in human tissue: and thus, of 
course, we are hairless, oversexed, brainy, long-lived, infantile, and artistic. 
Thus also, perhaps, we like stories and poetic rhythm. Of this more later.
The point is that we can no longer look at human cultural activity–
especially the very ancient kind, like oral performance–as simply arbitrary 
in form and structure. There are, so to speak, real artistic rules, just as the 
classical critics maintained (though for different reasons). Our brains and 
bodies will be happy, facile, vigorous, and inventive–radiant and porous, as 
Virginia Woolf (1957) puts it–when they use one kind of artistic structure, 
and not when they use another kind. We are better at telling stories than at 
saying concatenations of utterances that won’t make some kind of story. 
Babies prefer nursery rhymes to other kinds of sounds. We are better at 
reciting three-second chunks of language than eight-second chunks. And 
perhaps the “rules” of human art are quite exact and complex, and are 
discoverable, and may form the basis of a coherent literary criticism.
The oral tradition is linked to one of the most fundamental of human 
activities: ritual. Indeed, it would be hard to think of an occasion in which a 
traditional oral performance would not itself be part of a ritual occasion, and 
nearly as diffi cult to imagine a ritual without some kind of traditional oral 
performance. However, the signifi cance of this relationship has not been 
entirely clear, largely because the oral tradition has been the province of 
folklorists and literary scholars, while ritual has belonged to anthropology, 
religious
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studies, and ethology. Furthermore, it is only fairly recently that certain 
aspects of ritual have come to light, which have very exciting implications 
for the oral tradition as well.
Ritual, until the last few years, was often regarded as little more than 
superstitious, repetitive, neurotic, backward, and conservative behavior, 
beneath the notice of humane scholars, and discussed by social scientists 
as part of the fl ummery by which the harsh economic realities of society 
were disguised. Now, however, ritual is increasingly considered as one of 
our most vital, creative, and healthy activities. Three new discoveries have 
helped bring about this change. First, in anthropology and religious studies, 
it became clear that ritual, far from being a mindless activity, is often–
indeed in many societies, exclusively–the place where society stands back 
from itself, considers its own value system, criticizes it, and engages in its 
profoundest philosophical and religious commerce with what lies outside 
it, whether divine, natural, or subconscious. In ritual, human beings decide 
what they are and stipulate that identity for themselves, thereby asserting 
the most fundamental freedom of all, the freedom to be what they choose. 
The great life-crisis, calendrical, sacrifi cial, celebratory, and mystical 
rituals propose counter-structures to the normal structures of society, as 
Victor Turner has argued, and thereby constitute a large part of a society’s 
evolutionary and adaptive potential (espec. V. Turner 1968, 1969). Like 
the recombinations of genes which take place in sexual reproduction, they 
introduce variability and hybrid vigor into their society. What Turner calls 
“communitas”–the recognition of human siblinghood–comes to the fore in 
rituals and is reinvigorated for the sake of social cohesion. Rituals, moreover, 
are by no means static and unchanging, but are continually reinvented at 
that fertile interface between the individual and the collectivity. Students of 
the oral epic and the ballad will be quite familiar with this process.
Second, it is becoming obvious that human ritual is not entirely 
unique but belongs to a set of ritualized behaviors to be found among many 
species of higher animals. The great ethologists, Huxley, Lorenz, and others, 
have shown how pervasive is that marvelous counterfactual activity we 
call ritual among our fellow inhabitants of the planet (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1975, 
Lorenz 1962, Huxley 1966). One of the chief priorities of contemporary 
anthropology is to avoid drawing the obvious analogies between human 
and other animal rituals. Mating, aggression, territory,
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home-building, bonding, ranking, sexual maturity, birth: all have their ritual 
behaviors, human and animal. In fact the only major aspects of the life of an 
animal which are ritualized by human beings but not by other animals seem 
to be time and death.
But there is another, much greater difference between human and 
animal ritual. Animal rituals are passed down from one generation to another 
by essentially genetic means. The specifi c “fi xed action patterns” that act as 
mutual triggers in ritual interaction are either expressed automatically in a 
healthy animal or lie ready to be released by some stimulus (such as hearing 
the species-specifi c birdsong of a conspecifi c). The inborn ritual instincts 
of animals can be distorted by natural or artifi cial interference, but such 
distortions can only lead to permanent changes in a species’ ritual if the new 
behavior has a genetic basis and that genetic alteration confers a selective 
advantage upon the breeding individuals that possess it.
Human ritual, on the other hand, is passed down, in its particular 
details and even in many of its large structures, by means of tradition: a 
process of teaching and learning which need not wait for genetic changes to 
produce real novelty from one generation to the next. It may seem strange 
to describe tradition as a means of rapid change: but compared to genetic 
evolution, tradition is a positive hotbed of newfangledness. Some animals–
the classical example is the Japanese macaques (see Imarishi 1957, Frisch 
1959, Kawai 1965, Itani 1958) which invented the art of potato-washing and 
spread it through the whole population–can pass down simple technological 
innovations from one generation to another by means of tradition. But only 
humankind does so with ritual.
This does not mean that humankind does not inherit a genetic 
predisposition to ritual behavior in general: its universality and its evident 
psycho-physiological basis attest to an important genetic element. Further, 
there are many particular behaviors and forms which seem to be common to 
much human ritual and which are no doubt related to inherited anatomical, 
neural, and behavioral features of our species: rhythmic chanting, body 
decoration, communitas, tripartite structure, storytelling, and so on. But the 
crucial point is that we do not genetically inherit particular rituals, as other 
animals do, but rather a disposition to ritual in general and a fundamental 
grammar and lexicon of ritual elements with which we can generate an 
infi nite variety of rituals. Moreover, we
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can very rapidly change the rituals we already possess, through that 
refl exivity that the anthropologists have observed in ritual practice.
All the foregoing of course applies to the oral tradition. Beneath the 
oral tradition we can dimly make out its roots in more general primate and 
mammal ritualization; and if we look carefully we may begin to discern 
the inherited grammar and lexicon that we unconsciously use to make oral 
performances, and perhaps to make literary art.
Thus at the heart of human artistic performance we fi nd an archaic 
genetic armature of mammalian/primate ritual. Surrounding this core we 
fi nd a layer composed of the new, genetically-transmitted grammar and 
lexicon of human ritual performance, created by the interplay of biological 
and cultural evolution. Next, we fi nd the oral tradition itself: culturally 
evolved but directly reliant on the genetic structures which it itself imposed 
by selective pressure upon the species. Next above that is the recorded 
tradition, in which the limits of human memory are transcended by the 
technology of writing and print. Finally we encounter the realm of exegesis, 
criticism, and metacriticism, activities themselves conducted within the 
subtle ritual space of literature. This structure which I have described here 
is also the record of a historical development of increasing refl exivity, and at 
each point the leap from a more archaic system to a more sophisticated and 
refl exive one takes place through the needs and pressures of performance. 
The performance of the ancient genetic rituals led to their imitation, with 
variation, by the young, and the birth of the ritual tradition. The performance 
of the traditional rituals exerted selective pressure on the nervous systems 
of our ancestors–those who could not perform the rituals would not get a 
mate or even survive–which ingrained the performance “grammar” into the 
genes. In turn the demand of the priest-actors for external memory storage 
of complex ritual dramas led to the development of literary recording; and 
the performance of literary productions led to the need for exegesis and 
criticism, as recorded directorial notes to the actors, so to speak.
From this perspective it becomes clear that the arts should properly 
be regarded as the most fl uid, sophisticated, and refl exive subset of the 
broad general category of ritual performance, and the oral tradition as one 
of the crucial areas connecting the arts with the rest of the ritual continuum. 
The implications of this way of
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looking at the arts are especially striking for literary criticism, as we shall 
see.
The third exciting development in the study of ritual has been the 
recognition that ritual activity is tuned to observable mechanisms in the 
human brain and nervous system. The pathbreaking book The Spectrum 
of Ritual: A Biogenetic Structuralist Perspective (d’Aquili et al. 1979) has 
explored ritual trance and the massive cognitive, emotional, perceptual, 
somatic, and social changes it involves, and shown that it performs 
indispensable functions for the human individual as well as the group. 
Further, the book describes specifi c ritual techniques by which the trance 
state–whether light and barely noticeable or heavy and obvious–is brought 
about; the varieties of types of trance ranging from meditation to frenzy; 
and their characteristics in terms of brain chemistry, brain rhythms, 
and the functions of the ergotrophic, trophotropic, sympathetic, and 
parasympathetic systems, and the left and right hemispheres of the brain. 
Most interesting of all, perhaps, for our purposes, are two points: the close 
resemblance between the subjective effects of ritual trance and aesthetic 
pleasure; and the observation that the rhythmic driving of an endogenous 
brain rhythm by a synchronized external beat is one of the chief means by 
which those changes in brain state are produced. I and Ernst Pöppel, the 
German psychophysicist, have investigated the curious fact that all human 
poetry possesses regular lines that take roughly three seconds to recite, 
and have recently published our fi ndings in an article entitled “The Neural 
Lyre: Poetic Meter, the Brain, and Time” (Pöppel and Turner 1983). We 
concluded that poetic meter is a way of inducing much larger regions of the 
brain than the left-brain linguistic centers to co-operate in the poetic process 
of world-construction, and that one of the chief techniques of that world-
construction is the creation and maintenance of a hierarchy of temporal 
periodicities which makes sense of past events and is powerfully predictive 
of future ones. Recent work on the preferences of babies for nursery rhymes 
has confi rmed our fi ndings (Glenn and Cunningham 1983).
One of the most interesting questions in the contemporary study 
of the biology of aesthetics concerns the biological basis and evolutionary 
necessity of pleasure in general and aesthetic pleasure in particular. We 
participate in oral performances, just as we look at sculpture or listen to 
music, not primarily to be informed or edifi ed, but to be delighted. To an 
evolutionary biologist pleasure,
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like any other activity of an organism, serves an adaptive function; in this case, 
reward. The neuropsychologist James Olds (1976) and others (Routtenberg 
1980, Snyder 1977, Guillemin 1978, Konner 1962) have begun a close study 
of the reward systems of the brains of higher animals, with special attention 
to human beings. Other investigations in the same fi eld, such as Lionel Tiger 
(1979; see also Willer et al. 1981), have discovered an extensive group of 
very large peptide molecules which the brain can produce and in turn take up, 
and which are associated with the various subjective sensations of pleasure, 
ranging from high arousal to deep relaxation. These peptide molecules are 
large enough–only one step removed from the proteins–to carry information 
on their own account. Like most great scientifi c discoveries, this one was in a 
sense obvious, but only once it was pointed out. All it took was the question 
“Why do opium derivatives, cocaine, and other drugs produce such great 
pleasure?” Obviously our species could derive no adaptive advantage from 
consuming the resins of certain oriental poppies or South American shrubs, 
nor were they available to most members of the species. Thus the presence 
of the specifi c receptors in the brain which respond so sensitively to these 
chemicals cannot have anything to do with poppies or coca as such. They 
must then be designed to respond to internally generated chemicals which 
are crudely mimicked in structure by those herbal resins.
It soon became obvious that the internally generated brain rewards 
were more powerful, by many orders of magnitude, than the conventional 
motivators proposed by crude materialists and behaviorists. Rats will ignore 
the pangs of extreme hunger and thirst, and the presence of strong sexual 
stimuli, in order to press a bar which will either deliver the chemicals of 
delight or electrically stimulate their own brains to do so. If even rats do not 
live by bread alone, a fortiori neither do humans.
It is becoming clear that the “higher pleasures” of creative mental 
effort, of beauty, of goodness, of truth are indeed independent pleasures 
of their own and not merely perverted or sublimated versions of sexual 
or nourishment drives. The endorphins, as the endogenous brain chemicals 
are called, are clearly involved in aesthetic pleasure. Let us now return to 
our earlier question: what is the adaptive signifi cance of aesthetic pleasure? 
Why should we be designed to appreciate beauty, and to enjoy it with an 
intensity which is potentially much greater than that of hunger or lust?
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One clue is afforded us by the fact that the “pleasure-chemicals” 
are by no means “sure-fi re” in their effect. Indeed they can even apparently 
be painful if administered without warning and without the control of the 
subject (Valenstein 1974). Thus these pleasures must be associated with 
the autonomy, the power over the future, and the predictive capacities of 
the organism. Yet the sense of beauty is not the same as the exultation of 
power, though it can resemble it. We associate beauty with a certain set of 
perceived objects, and with a certain manner of perception, cognition, and 
emotional comprehension, but not necessarily with action as such; some 
of our strongest experiences of beauty take place in response to our own 
endogenous imagery of dream, fantasy, or memory. The feeling of beauty, 
then, is a reward for a certain autonomous activity of the brain, one which 
gives the brain a grip on the future, which is, however, not necessarily 
involved with immediate external actions to change the environment. We are 
rewarded powerfully by the pleasures of taste and sex, for the metabolically 
expensive activities of foraging and reproducing ourselves; otherwise we 
might not bother. But the creation and appreciation of beauty is much more 
metabolically expensive, and is rewarded by a pleasure which, according to 
neurochemistry, is fi fty times stronger than heroin, for which in turn human 
beings will happily neglect the delights of sex and eating. What activity can 
be so much more important than nourishment and reproduction?
The answer to this question necessitates an understanding of the 
ethological term Umwelt, in the special sense that Von Uexkull (1909) used 
it when describing the behavior and perception of animals. Every animal has 
a species-specifi c world, a set of relevant factors in its enviroment which its 
receptors–its senses–are designed to detect and its effectors–its limbs and 
other active organs–to act upon. Outside that world, that umwelt, nothing 
exists as far as that animal is concerned: for instance, visual phenomena have 
no existence for an eyeless species, nor subterranean ones for an animal not 
equipped for digging. For those animals with simpler nervous systems, the 
umwelt is a crude one containing only a few unrelated elements: there is a 
fairly direct link between stimulus and action, without much intermediate 
interpretation of the various sensory inputs. For advanced species, on the 
other hand, with a much higher ratio of nervous tissue to body weight, and 
with complex cortical development, the evidence
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from many receptors is continuously integrated into a coherent universe of 
enduring objects in motion relative to each other and to the organism, with 
their own smell, sound, taste, and touch and their own sensitivity to each 
other and to the organism that perceives them. Now nowhere in physics 
is it asserted that such entities as enduring objects exist. They come into 
existence, as far as we know, as the highly elegant constructs of the brains 
of higher animals: physics knows only a complex interplay of the four 
fundamental forces at various intensities, wavelengths, and vectors. The 
concrete universe of objects as we, the higher animals, know it is just the most 
parsimonious, ordered, powerful, coherent, and comprehensive hypothesis 
that will reconcile our inherited expectations with our experience.
When we encounter words like “elegant,” “parsimonious,” “ordered,” 
“powerful,” “coherent,” and “comprehensive,” we are already in aesthetic 
territory. There is no reason, logical or empirical, why the world should 
be elegantly and economically organized, nor is it necessarily better, in a 
moral sense, that it should be. It is simply more beautiful that way; and can 
therefore be more effi ciently dealt with. Before a species can reproduce itself 
or even eat, it must enter a consistent working relationship with its world, 
its umwelt, which will generate confi rmable or deconfi rmable predictions. 
Such a relationship is the harder to maintain, the more information an 
organism is capable of absorbing, and the more it is capable of doing–the 
human brain uses about one-third of the body’s oxygen and nutrients. Thus 
this world-constructing, cosmogenetic activity must be provided with a very 
powerful inducement and motivation. World-creation is hard work, and has 
high rewards.
Now what distinguishes artistic performance from ritual in general 
is that the sense of beauty, the aesthetic, is more directly and specifi cally 
involved in the former. Thus we may say of oral performance, which lies 
toward the artistic end of the ritual spectrum, that it is a cosmogenetic 
activity, perhaps vital to the maintenance of the human umwelt. Further, 
we might speculate that because the human umwelt is itself much more 
learned than inherited–though we inherit a predisposition to learn a complex 
umwelt–the activity of world construction is for humans much more vital, 
much more diffi cult, and much more highly rewarded than it is among the 
other animals, whose umwelt is relatively more inherent in their genes. Thus 
the tradition of oral
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performance may be much more closely tied to our survival as a species 
than we think, since it is our specialization to create worlds to be tested 
against sensory experience, as it is the mole’s to dig and the bird’s to fl y.
It should, moreover, be stressed that “world-creation” is not a 
metaphor, or rather not a metaphor only. As we know from quantum physics, 
the precise characteristics of the fundamental constituents of the physical 
universe are not decided until they are registered or measured by some 
other system that is selectively sensitive to those characteristics themselves 
(Wheeler 1977, Finkelstein 1982). This in fact follows, as does relativity 
theory, from the basic scientifi c principle that the only things that can be 
said to exist are those things which are measurable. All entities selectively 
measure each other, and thus we can say that the universe is exactly and 
only what its constituents appear to each other to be. Thus human world-
construction is a perfectly genuine activity, with as much ontological 
legitimacy as the reaction of any particle to any other particle: indeed, more, 
because human perception and cognition sifts out much more severely than 
does an elementary particle any phenomena that are not highly probable and 
mutually confi rming. Of course, human world-construction is more effective 
if it has already, by scientifi c observation and experiment, canvassed the 
reactions of a good sample of non-human entities and placed itself in a 
position which can be construed as being in agreement with them, or at least 
not in contradiction. But anything about which the universe is not already 
in agreement with itself is not yet decided: and there remains an infi nite 
number of topics which have not yet come up for consideration. Human 
ritual, performance, and art are ways of setting the stage, creating the frame, 
arranging the agenda, and picking the topic in such a way as to give human 
beings a home ground advantage in making the ontological contract. Much 
human art and ritual does not even need, and would be embarrassed by, 
confi rmation by non-human participants: fi ction is explicitly counterfactual 
as are the phantom antagonists in the triumph-ceremony of the geese; and a 
congregation would be rightly horrifi ed to fi nd the contents of the chalice to 
be arterial red, sticky, and liable to swift clotting.
But how exactly are the brains of individuals prepared and 
synchronized with each other to work the marvelous transubstantiation of 
artistic and ritual performance? Here the
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study of oral tradition is especially valuable.
We have already touched on the power of rhythmic repetition as 
a psychic technology. Perhaps the fundamental characteristic of the oral 
tradition is its use of rhythmic language. At its crudest level, chanting is a 
form of rhythmic driving, affecting the limbic system of the brain. A strobe 
light tuned to a 10 cps period can produce trance states and even epileptic-
like seizures, by “driving” the brain’s alpha rhythm. Likewise, as Pöppel and 
I (1983) discovered, the three-second period of chants and poetry is tuned 
to the largest periodicity in the hearing-system: the subjective present, the 
basic “chunk” in which the auditory cortex digests and processes acoustic 
information. The effects of this “driving” stimulation include trancelike 
feelings, joy, peace, harmony, certainty, a coherent mood, and even mystical 
elevation. More interesting still was the use of rhythmic variation within 
the three-second unit: when the line differs in rhythm from the metrical 
expectation, that difference itself carries information (as a carrier-wave is 
distorted by the message it transmits). But the kind of information it carries 
is not linguistic, and is not accessible to left-brain linguistic/temporal 
processing. Instead, it is registered and interpreted in the right-brain mode, 
as a gestalt, like a musical melody or a pictorial image. Thus metered poetry 
and chanting force the brain to operate in a “stereo” mode, so to speak, 
integrating left and right brain channels of information and translating them 
into each other. Rhythmic metered language–”numbers” as the neoclassicists 
were wont to say–brings to bear not only the limbic system but also the right 
brain on its verbal, left-brain content. There are two consequences of these 
effects. One is social: it enables a community to become synchronized, 
“on each other’s wavelength” as we say, or “in synch,” so that signifi cant 
variation is instantly perceived as meaningful by all participants; and the 
feelings of pleasure and love produced by the endorphin reward help weld 
the individuals together. The other is spiritual: by extending the region of the 
brain that is at work on its integrative, cosmogenetic functions, it prepares 
us for that active inventive imposition on the world of our own cultural 
umwelt, our own construction of it.
There is increasing evidence (Levy 1974, 1984, forthcoming) that 
it is the exchange of information between right-brain and left-brain modes 
which constitutes what various researchers have called the human “cognitive 
imperative,” the “aha” or “eureka”
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moment, “monocausotaxophilia,” or the “what is it” syndrome: the human 
capacity to make sense of the world. At present fascinating research is being 
done by Colwyn Trevarthen, Robert Turner, and others, using new Nuclear 
Magnetic Resonance Scanning techniques to examine the myelinization 
(that is, the activation of neural fi bers by acquisition of a coating of myelin) 
of the corpus callosum, the body that connects the left with the right side 
of the brain. This research may show how acculturation actually changes 
the structure of the brain, wiring together various brain elements across the 
commissure.
But the cooperation of left and right brain which is sponsored by 
rhythmic language not only makes us more intelligent and creative, but 
also enormously increases the power of our memory. Here we may note 
a remarkable convergence between the work of the psychophysiologists 
on the bilateral asymmetry of brain function, the brilliant investigations 
of traditional mnemonic systems by Frances Yates and others, and the 
pathbreaking work of Parry, Lord, and their modern followers on methods 
by which illiterate epic poets are able to perform thousands of lines of 
poetry.
Yates (1969) describes the Renaissance system as essentially a 
mapping of the discourse to be remembered onto the interior of a large 
house with many rooms, upon each of whose walls there are niches (or 
places, the “commonplaces” of a common-place book) which contain 
objects associated with the topics of the discourse. By imaginatively walking 
around this “memory theater” in a particular order of rooms, an orator can 
recall a highly complex series of points with great exactness, and even be 
able to retrace his steps or take a different route.
A brain scientist would instantly recognize this procedure as a way 
of translating left-brain temporal sequence, for which we have a very poor 
memory–telephone numbers are only seven digits long because any more 
would overload our short-term memory buffer–into the right-brain spatial 
gestalt mode. We can remember very complex locations and images, and 
with some subjects, for instance dwelling-places, our powers of recall and 
recognition of spatial patterns are astonishing. Thus mnemonic systems 
remedy the defi ciency of left-brain memory by means of the pattern-
recognition talents of the right brain.
Oddly enough, the procedure of memorizing a sequence by mapping 
it onto a series of rooms in a house has also been
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described to me independently by a fl amenco guitarist and a jazz musician, 
when asked how they remember musical compositions. On the other hand, 
a composer has told me that he sometimes records a musical phrase in his 
memory by associating it with the rhythm of a quotation from the Bible 
that he knows by heart. Here a right-brain pattern is remembered by its 
connection with a left-brain sequence. Perhaps the fundamental point is that 
any memory is safer if kept in both modes, left and right. We might go so far 
as to say we only know something truly when we have translated it back and 
forth between the two sides of the brain a few times. The great authority on 
lateral brain function, Jerre Levy, has indeed said just this (1984: 31-33).
Do we not fi nd a similar basic strategy in the techniques of the oral 
epic (see Parry 1971 and Lord 1960)? Homer and the Yugoslav epic poets 
evidently strung formulaic half-lines upon the melodic gestalt geography 
of a plotline, reinforcing the mnemonic properties of their words by poetic 
rhythm, calling into play by the “driving” mechanism the affective capacities 
of the midbrain, and activating the right brain by means of signifi cant 
metrical variation. The muses may indeed be daughters of memory, in this 
sense.
In such a perspective plot, or story, becomes crucially important. 
The “unity of action” Aristotle talks about–the homecoming of Odysseus, 
the wrath of Achilles, the avenging of Agamemnon–functions as a sort of 
connected series of rooms, containing places for memory storage. Plot, 
moreover, with its capacity to organize large units of time, extends the 
harmonious patterning of temporal periodicities that we fi nd in poetic meter 
to larger and larger scales, organizing a voluminous body of material and 
broadening the temporal horizon of memory and expectation. The “now” 
or present moment of a story (if “now” is, say, Odysseus’ journey home) 
can cover a length of many years. Once the “now” of a story reaches out 
to include even the death of the hero or heroine, tragedy, and the highest 
forms of literary art, become possible. What makes us human, what enables 
us to transcend the worldviews of other animals, is our greater capacity to 
organize and comprehend time (see Fraser 1975). Perhaps this is the reason 
why rituals of temporality and funeral are unique to human beings.
Plot not only unites right-brain pattern recognition with the left-
brain capacity to deal with large units of time; it also connects
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these cortical functions in turn with the limbic system and its powerful 
rewards. It does this by the process of identifi cation. If the self is the 
governing subset of mental relations, including a set of symbols refl exively 
representative of that subset, then other persons whom I know, including 
characters in a story or drama, are smaller subsets with their own symbol 
clusters. The integrative activity of relating those subsets with each other 
and especially with one’s self-subset is rewarded neurochemically by the 
subjective feelings of love, sympathy, insight, pity, or satiric triumph. 
Further, the self is the focus of those sensations of fear, desire, anger, and so 
on with which the organism responds to its environment, sensations under 
the control of the limbic system. Identifi cation, as we all know who have 
followed the fate of a character in an adventure with bated breath, makes us 
feel the character’s emotions as if they were our own. Thus plot promotes 
and exercises the relations between cortical world-construction and limbic 
reward. We shall return to the issue of plot later on, in a literary-critical 
context; suffi ce it to say here that the modernist tendency to dispense with 
or demote plot may have been a grave mistake.
The fact that comprehension and memory demand the literal 
cooperation of both sides of the brain, and that the cortex as a whole is 
motivated and rewarded by the limbic system, may afford us fascinating 
insights into the nature of symbolism. The arts inherited the technique 
of symbolism from earlier forms of ritual, where it served a purpose not 
unlike that of rhythmic meter. On the cortical level a symbol evidently acts 
as a connective between a left-brain linguistic proposition, or network of 
propositions, and a right-brain image or image cluster. This may explain 
why the more obvious forms of allegory and emblem are sometimes 
tiresome, unmemorable, and insipid, for they connect only linguistic with 
linguistic, left-brain with left-brain information, and do not possess the 
fertile suggestive tension and memorability which comes about when the 
corpus callosum must translate, with only partial success, from one mode 
to the other.
Symbols also, as Victor Turner has pointed out (1967), connect 
the higher brain with the lower. Symbols possess two poles: ideological 
(cortical) and orectic (limbic). The great ritual and artistic symbols are 
reward systems of their own, relating pleasurable emotion or sensation with 
the higher values, and priming the pump of self-reward.
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In a memory system symbols correspond to the suggestive objects 
which are to be found in the niches or places of the memory theater. From 
the analysis it follows that mere images in themselves, without a left-brain 
discursive component, will be insignifi cant and insipid; and that symbolism 
only makes sense when it is set in the context of a comprehensible and 
reproducible sequence of places, rather than jumbled up together as in much 
modernist literature. To the extent that symbolists and imagists abandoned 
argument, plot, and discursive reason, to that extent they broke the mysterious 
and fertile connection between left cortex, right cortex, and limbic system. 
Eliot’s phrase in The Wasteland, “a heap of broken images,” is very apt: and 
we may now see this poem, despite the disorganizing interference of Ezra 
Pound, as an attempt to restring those images together upon the primeval 
sequences of ancient myth. And to turn from heroic pathology to heroic 
health, consider the Shield of Achilles passage in the Iliad, or even the 
whole of the Divine Comedy, as a memory theater within which symbols, 
themselves memorably uniting left with right and higher with lower, are in 
turn memorably and signifi cantly positioned in a varied metrical medium 
along a temporal plotline and within a spatial, gestalt geography. These 
passages are summative statements of the healthy and productive human 
psyche, and also of the cosmos that is generated by the performative fi at of 
such a psyche, and apparently they have delivered to generations of reader/
performers the sweet shock of endorphin reward.
It may be that modern literary criticism, by treating literature as 
if it were merely a linguistic left-brain art–with the authority, one might 
speculate, of Lessing’s Laocoon, which insisted on purity of medium in the 
arts–was doing literature a grave disservice. Once literature becomes only a 
pattern of “differences,” of words translating other words, and the left brain 
is cut off from the right and from the limbic system, then the way is open to 
the vacuity and anti-cosmos that the deconstructionists perceive at the heart 
of all literary art. It is interesting that this was also the period in which the 
poetic narrative was replaced by more exclusively left-brain prose genres, 
the plotless “new novel” replaced the traditional “page-turner” of Austen 
and Tolstoy and free verse replaced metered poetry. Story and rhythm, plot 
and image, image and rhythm, were increasingly separated. Meanwhile, in 
the visual arts the Renaissance dictum ut pictura poesis–a
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bilateral epigram–was set aside, as, in modernist music, tonality, melody, 
recognizable rhythm, and articulated temporal structures were often 
abandoned. Even in modern architecture there has been what almost seems 
to be a conspiracy to detach the left brain from the right, by creating spatial 
structures which are so uniform and repetitious that pattern-recognition 
becomes impossible and we are reduced to counting to fi nd our way through 
them. And “functionalism” sometimes appears to be a way of denying the 
viewer the comfortable and organic rewards that are provided to the limbic 
system. No wonder, perhaps, so many of the younger generation turned to 
artifi cial substitutes for the endorphins.
The neurological perspective also offers insights into the matter of 
discursive argument and logical persuasion in literature. In Plato’s Dialogues, 
which at points are little removed from the philosophical exchanges in 
Sophocles and Euripides, we can clearly see that the origins of argument and 
discourse may be found in plot and story. Argument is basically a kind of 
story, the story of a war of words between heroic verbal antagonists. As such 
it possesses the integrating properties, in neural terms, that I have already 
described. Like a story, a good argument is memorable, and transcends, 
because of its hierarchical organization of larger and larger temporal units, 
the left-brain weakness in recalling mere lists (the limitation that the spatial 
mapping of the memory system is designed to overcome). What follows 
from this analysis is that when the treatise succeeds the dialogue we have 
stepped away from the integrative properties of a plotline. We only hear 
one side of the story, so to speak; and unlike Plato, Aristotle must replace 
the gestalt structuring of plot with a sort of geometrical structure of logical 
dependence. Aristotle, without the continuing story of the actors in the 
dialogue, cannot afford those delightful wayward changes of subject which 
we fi nd in Plato, unless he has already prepared a logical place for the new 
block of discursive masonry. Yet even the stonemason Socrates, the oral 
philosopher, is one step away from the agonistic story of the Atreides.
The lessons to be learned for literature, if we are to preserve its 
ancient ritual powers of psychic and cosmic integration, are that discursive 
argument has a vital place in literature, as long as it preserves its primal ties 
with story, or else replaces those ties with powerful integrative symbolism.
It might be argued that despite evolution, ethology, and brain 
chemistry, the study and practice of oral performance does not
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necessarily require a “deep grammar,” a set of natural classical rules, an 
explanatory evolutionary paradigm, such as I am postulating here. However, 
a serious consideration of the matter from a cross-cultural perspective 
reveals, across a wide range of human activities and types of culture and 
social organization, an extraordinary unanimity of cultural forms that points 
to a powerful and signifi cant common inheritance. I quote a remarkable 
list, compiled by the anthropologist George Peter Murdock (1968: 231) “of 
items . . . which occur, so far as the author’s knowledge goes, in every 
culture known to history or ethnography”: “. . . age-grading, athletic sports, 
bodily adornment, calendar, cleanliness training, community organization, 
cooking, cooperative labor, cosmology, courtship, dancing, decorative art, 
divination, division of labor, dream interpretation, education, eschatology, 
ethics, ethnobotany, etiquette, faith healing, family, feasting, fi remaking, 
folklore, food taboos, funeral rites, housing, hygiene, incest taboos, 
inheritance rules, joking, kin-groups, kinship nomenclature, language, 
law, luck superstitions, magic, marriage, mealtimes, medicine, modesty 
concerning natural functions, mourning, music, mythology, natal care, 
pregnancy usages, property rights, propitiation of supernatural beings, 
puberty customs, religious ritual, residence rules, sexual restrictions, 
soul concepts, status differentiation, surgery, tool making, trade, visiting, 
weaning, and weather control.”
Murdock would probably not object if we added to this list 
the additional cultural forms of combat, mime, friendship, lying, love, 
storytelling, murder taboos, and poetic meter; and it would be tempting 
to propose that a work of literary art can be fairly accurately gauged for 
greatness of quality by the number of these items it contains, embodies, and 
thematizes. They are all in the Iliad, The Divine Comedy, King Lear, and 
War and Peace; and most of them can be found in relatively short works of 
major literature, like Wordsworth’s Intimations Ode, or Milton’s Nativity 
Ode, or even–very compressed–in Yeats’ “Among School Children.” These 
topics indeed virtually exhaust the content of the oral tradition; taken 
together they constitute a sort of deep syntax and deep lexicon of human 
culture. It is the function of the oral tradition to preserve, integrate, and 
continually renew this deep syntax and lexicon, while using it to construct 
coherent world-hypotheses. Literature, which is to the oral tradition as the 
oral tradition is to ritual, extends these functions by means of that
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greater refl exiveness and sophistication obtained by the technological 
prosthesis of script and books, so that those world-hypotheses gain in power, 
predictiveness, and beauty.
The relative universality of a given theme or form in human linguistic 
art can serve to test its legitimacy as a correct usage of the genetically 
inherited cultural grammar and lexicon. If we fi nd a story (the descent 
into the underworld, say) or a technique (metrical variation, for instance) 
which is repeated in hunter-gatherer, peasant, city-state, and technopolitan 
cultures, then we know that we have encountered a paradigm declension 
or defi nition of a pan-human verbal artistic element. Further, as artists, and 
even as critics searching for a way to describe an unusual literary work, 
we can use the rich variety of types in human verbal art as a storehouse of 
sound, handy, and vital ideas. Cultural universals are to our new ontological 
criticism what Darwin’s voluminous collection of examples of adaptation in 
nature were to his theory of natural selection.
For instance, the study of poetic meter conducted by Pöppel and 
myself showed the three-second line (or rather, lines of about 2-4 seconds, 
with a strong peak at three) in English, Anglo-Saxon, Celtic, French, 
German, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, Ancient Hebrew, Chinese, Japanese, 
New Guinea Eipo, Ancient Greek, Latin, and African Ndembu poetry. 
Syllable-counts suggest the same for Finnish, Russian, and some Amerindian 
cultures. More remarkable still, I am informed by Deborah Wasserman, the 
authority on mime, that a phrase or beat in mime is usually about three 
seconds long, a fact which suggests either that the three-second period is the 
“specious present” not only of the auditory information processing system, 
but also of human temporal information processing in general; or that mime 
is paradoxically a partly, if implicitly, linguistic art. An interesting test 
would be to time the intervals between pauses in congenitally deaf users of 
standard American Sign Language, using as controls signers who were once 
able to hear, and signers with perfect hearing.
What a poet or critic will learn from this is that very probably the 
peculiar benefi ts of metered poetry will be lost if the line is too long, too 
short, or too irregular in length. And since every example of verse studied 
by us has metrical features–rhyme, assonance, syllable count, stress pattern, 
tone pattern, even syntax–repeated from line to line, even free verse in three-
second lines would not retain the qualities created by strict adherence to
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the deep syntax of poetic meter.
Perhaps we can see the same phenomenon at work in the remarkable 
similarity of mythic story elements from all over the world. Joseph 
Campbell’s magisterial new atlas of human mythology extends his earlier 
important work on “the hero with a thousand faces” to many other mythic 
ingredients than the hero (1983). James Frazer (1911), Claude Lévi-Strauss 
(1969), and David Bynum (1978) have explored in depth yet other themes. 
Perhaps the instinct of some of the greater modernists–Yeats, Joyce, Eliot, 
Lawrence, Mann–to seek in ancient myth the coherence that the modern 
world did not seem to offer, was a wise one. However, it seems to me that the 
kind of grasping for a mythic lifebelt that we fi nd, say, in “Sweeney Among 
the Nightingales” is not entirely healthy. The ebullient mythopoeia, the easy 
and cavalier luxuriance of mythic invention, that is characteristic of the 
better contemporary science fi ction, such as Lindsay’s Voyage to Arcturus 
(1920), Herbert’s Dune (1965), Wolfe’s New Sun tetralogy (1980-81), and 
Le Guin’s Left Hand of Darkness (1969) is to my mind the sign of a much-
healed culture. Like the classical Greeks, late medieval Florentines, and 
Renaissance Elizabethans, such writers naturally and confi dently adapt the 
old mythic grammar and lexicon to new uses. Science-fi ction has its own 
vocabulary of critical terms, one of which is “time-binding.” The phrase is 
almost untranslatable into ordinary critical language, but it is unmistakably 
referring to the mapping of left-brain temporal modes of understanding onto 
right-brain spatial gestalt modes, and vice versa.
But we need not even go out into ancient or foreign cultures to fi nd 
rich sources of insight into the “deep language” of human word art. The 
oral tradition continues in our own culture in at least two realms: liturgy 
and theater. Liturgy and theater can serve the same function for our new 
ontological theory of criticism that the practices of domestication and 
selective breeding served for Darwin’s theory of evolution. They are, as 
it were, a vast experiment lying close at hand, familiar to all, and even a 
warrant in advance of the practical applications of the theory. And when 
we consider in these contexts the practice of rehearsal, the relationship 
between script (whether a text or a verbal tradition) and performance, the 
structure and articulation of a performance, the relationship between actor 
and audience, priest and congregation, the special uses of dramatic and 
liturgical language,
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the nature of dramatic and liturgical suspense, the relationship between actor 
and role, the changes in mental state during performance, the relationship 
between actuality and possibility in church or theater, and between theme 
and variation, we may see many elements which have remained unchanged 
since prehistoric times and which can serve as a framework and animating 
principle for a truly ontological criticism.
The crucial idea here is performance. It was pointed out earlier that 
it is performance that drives the refl exive, innovative, and evolutionary 
tendency of human ritual and art. And now that we are privileged to have 
had a half-century of subtle research into the nature of performance, by such 
fi gures as Stanislavsky (1936), Jerzy Grotowski (1968), Richard Schechner 
(1977, 1981), and Victor Turner (1974, 1981), we possess the materials for 
a new integration of literary criticism based on the very defi nite structures, 
effects, and requirements of successful performance.
Perhaps the most prosaic requirement for effective performance 
is the fundamental triadic structure, described by Aristotle as beginning, 
middle, and end, and by Victor Turner as the ritual sequence of separation–
liminal period–re-aggregation. Simple as this structure seems, it has 
profound implications. One is that if an audience, or even a single reader, 
is not introduced into a work by a proper beginning, conducted out of it by 
a satisfactory ending, or given a space in between and matter to play with 
in that space, the grammar of human art is being violated, the carrier-wave 
of signifi cant communication is swamped with noise, and the endorphin 
reward is aborted.
More interesting still, the sequence implies motion into, through, 
and out of a concentric entity, a passing through, a trial, a risk. The Latin 
periculum, from which we get “peril,” is related to “experience,” and 
“experiment”; the word is cognate with the Germanic “fear.” The beginning 
and the end are the gates into and out of a realm which, by defi nition, 
cannot be of this world, and may be dangerous, but which is essential to our 
sentient life. We fi nd the threefold structure elaborated in the fi ve acts of a 
Shakespearean play, and in the sevenfold divisions of Greek tragedy; and 
the concentric pattern is repeated in the architecture of the arenas, stupas, 
temple-plots, shrines, and theaters where the performance event takes place. 
The Globe Theater is paradigmatic. We fi nd it also in the mandala, a visual 
instrument of meditation analogous to chanting, which is the corresponding 
acoustic
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instrument. Walt Disney’s Magic Kingdoms in California, Florida, and 
Tokyo have the same concentric labyrinthine shape. The deep meaning 
of this shape is, I believe, refl exivity: the beginning and the end are like 
mathematical parentheses, or better, quotation marks, that distinguish 
the unrefl exive “use” of a word from the refl exive “mention” of it, as the 
philosophers would say. One of the earliest strategies of living matter was 
to envelop itself with a membrane of lipids which were hydrophobic at 
one end and hydrophilic at the other, and which attracted each other at the 
sides, thus constituting a cell. The cell is a sort of parenthetical comment 
on the rest of physical reality, containing a controlled environment isolated 
from the world by a semipermeable skin. The “three-act” structure is a full 
experience of what life is, a passing through from the outside to an inside 
and thence back to the outside; or it might even be more accurate to say that 
the beginning and the end of an imaginative performance are where we pass 
out of the common world and return into it. To the extent that we are not our 
environment, each person is a little piece of not-world, of counterfactuality 
guarded by a membrane, a seven-gated city with armed warriors–teeth or 
antibodies or critical reason–on guard at the gates. Art can be a passport, or 
the branch of golden leaves, that allows us to enter and to leave.
But to stand outside the wall and consider it as we are doing now 
is to constitute ourselves as another outer wall, surrounding the inner wall. 
What does this new outer wall look like from the outside? If we back up 
to see, we make yet another wall beyond; the “I” that contemplates the 
“myself” is in turn reduced to a “myself” that is contemplated by a new “I.” 
Thus concentric structures tend to multiply themselves, as two mirrors will 
when confronted with each other. If one mirror is square and one is round, 
the shape one sees when one is in between is the shape of the mandala, 
which possesses hypnotic qualities: the city is surrounded by many walls, 
the living organism by a richer and richer integument of membranes, which 
include senses, limbs, and nervous system. Or perhaps the elaboration of 
skins takes place in an inward direction, and the neocortex is the innermost 
skin of all. Consciousness is the moment-by-moment accumulation of 
memory of one’s previous self, a continuous growing of new rings; and 
subjective time is simply the experience of that growth. From the point of 
view of the hearing system, each “ring” is three seconds thick, the length of 
a moment, of an iambic pentameter.
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These last two paragraphs might be taken as a kind of gloss on the 
statement “all the world’s a stage.” There is a deep paradox in this statement 
which points us to another universal element of performance, another rule 
of human artistic language. Simply put, we cannot detach the sense of 
“act” as “pretend, counterfeit” from the sense of “act” as “do.” To really 
do something is by defi nition not to merely counterfeit something; and yet 
there is a terrifying wisdom in the stubborn resistance of the word “act” 
to being claimed, as it were, by either of its two senses and thus losing 
its strange logical tension. To do, says the word “act,” always involves a 
pretense, just as to win a kingdom is fi rst to be a pretender to the throne. 
Any true act we do is a pushing out into the realm of the unaccustomed 
(otherwise it would not be an act but merely part of our regular being); it is 
to step out of our previous identity and into another. The same ambiguity is 
found in the word “perform”: “I pay you for performance, not to put on a 
performance.” So also a plot, a story, is also always a deceptive conspiracy. 
The free play of a system, when it is doing what naturally is proper to it, 
is after all only “play.” Every real stage we go through is only a stage. The 
person is a mask; the character is only what is scratched or engraved onto a 
surface to make it mean something it did not mean before. The agon is an 
agony; agere means both to drive and to do; an agent is not necessarily the 
real doer of a legal deed. To make something is to make it up; its makeup 
or constitution is perhaps only makeup or cosmetics. “Art” itself implies 
artifi ce, even wiles and charms.
What we learn from this relentless pattern of lexical paradoxes is 
that to pretend to be something is to go a long way toward becoming it. St. 
Paul uses the normal word for dressing-up when he says “Put ye on Christ”; 
by putting Him on the Christian becomes his Christ, a becoming garment 
indeed. And all action involves a risk of deception, or even a perilous loss 
of self. The “passing through” of experience is perhaps a proper cause for 
fear. For the literary artist or critic one consequence is plain: a completely 
honest literary art cannot exist, if honesty implies no fi ction, no “making 
up,” no departure from the self as it is up to now. Literature is not a record of 
experience, but an experience, if literature is true to its roots in performance. 
To take us into it, a literary work must deceive us, take us in. The lyric poem 
which honestly and accurately sets down the poet’s sensations or feelings 
without artifi ce is not in this sense art, or
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poetry (which means, literally, “making up”), at all. And “real life” is the 
same: the only way one attains a real autonomous self, if these linguistic 
paradoxes are accurate, is to assume one, to play or act or play-act oneself 
so convincingly that like the First Player in Hamlet one forces one’s soul to 
one’s own conceit (Greenblatt 1980).
In this way the old Romantic problem, the confl ict between spontaneity 
and self-consciousness, is exploded. Consciousness, or refl exivity, if it is 
actively affecting the very person that is generating it, always immediately 
loses itself and becomes spontaneous in the amplifying reverberations of its 
own feedback system. It is the attempt to cling to an unrefl exive “natural” 
self that is paralyzing; and this, not excessive consciousness, is the real 
source of the malaise that Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats complain of. 
The highest kind of “fl ow,” to adopt the language of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi 
(1975), who contrasts the spontaneity of “fl ow” with the refl exiveness of 
“frame,” occurs when refl exiveness itself has reached its specifi c “speed 
of light” and is so total that it has lost the awkwardness of ordinary self-
consciousness. Stage actors describe this experience as being like fl ying, and 
insist that it occurs only and essentially in performance (O’Brien 1985). Yet 
readers too report the same near-breathlessness, the slight rising of the hair 
and goosefl esh, the pricking of incipient tears, the mixture of total control 
with total freedom as the limits of one’s consciousness-system are reached, 
transcended, and re-created. Is reading, at its best, a kind of performance, 
then? If so, our critical theory must be largely overhauled.
Theatrical or ritual performance usually involves the cooperation 
of a relatively more active priest or artist, and a relatively less active 
congregation or audience (though both are necessary). What kind of a 
performance, then, is reading?
Literature is not usually referred to as a “performing” or “lively” 
art at all. But the perspective we have developed here would deny that 
distinction. If literary art is truly descended from the oral tradition, then 
indeed it is performed. The performer in this case is two persons: the writer 
and the reader; the critic is the virtuoso performer, whose criticism is a sort 
of master-class.
Given the conception of reader as performer, another central element 
of performance becomes crucially important. What Stanislavsky showed 
was that an actor must have a clear, single objective (even if it is a very 
profound one) in order to perform
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convincingly. Modern literary criticism, with its love of ambiguity, multiple 
meanings, dialectical hermeneutics, and deconstructive unraveling of 
contradictory signifi cance, has provided every work of literature, as a text, 
with a divine plenum of viable interpretations. The text is an infi nite and 
eternal set of possibilities. Like an electron before it is detected, which 
can only be described as a fi nite (if usually infi nitesimal) likelihood of an 
electron-type event spread throughout the entire universe from its beginning 
to its end, with a strong peak of probability in a particular region, the text 
for a modern critic is essentially indeterminate, unactualized, and perhaps 
unactualizable.
But a reading–like a reading on an instrument designed to make an 
electron declare itself–if it is a true performance, must choose an objective 
and must sacrifi ce the divine indeterminacy and infi nitude of possibility 
for the tragic and concrete fi nitude of actuality. It is simply impossible to 
perform a reading and keep the text of the modern critic. The text dies into 
its reading as the divine incarnate victim dies into the eucharistic sacrament. 
The honor, the sadness, and the glory of true theatrical performance lies 
partly in the consciousness of all the participants that the work of art is 
dying with each reverberation into the air at the very moment that it is 
actualized.
What are the implications for the critic? Perhaps if he or she is a 
virtuoso performer, it is to give so lucid, so defi nite a reading that the work 
is actualized and made concrete before us, and reincarnated into the deepest 
idiom and costume and dialect of our own time.
Perhaps ambiguity is less of a virtue than we thought it was. The 
universe began as a soup of chance, and its evolution into the exquisite 
forms of life and intelligence was a cumulative process of greater and greater 
lawfulness, defi niteness, and certainty, carrying with it, of course, greater and 
greater gradients of possible fall-back into the ambiguous chaos of its origins 
(Eigen and Winkler 1981). Anything ordered, beautiful, actual, and concrete 
stands tragically high above the precipice of undifferentiated “hermeneutic 
richness.” Great literature is the achievement of an unmistakable clarity and 
intelligibility in the teeth of the proclivity of every word, every sentence, 
to collapse entropically into divine indeterminacy. The only legitimate 
use of ambiguity in literature is perhaps as part of a fi nesse toward greater 
actuality of coherent meaning: as sandcastle makers may, to achieve greater 
compactness,
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wet the sand they use with the very element that will destroy their creation 
when the tide comes in. In a performance multiple meanings only work 
if they redundantly resonate the carrier wave of its lawfulness; the proper 
contradictions of literary language, like the ones implicit in Shakespeare’s 
use of the word “act,” are like the facing mirrors in a laser that organize the 
plenum of wavelengths and phases in a light beam into a coherent pulse of 
energy. Only with such an instrument can truly three-dimensional images 
be wrung like ghosts from the plot, rhythm, symbolism, and argument of a 
literary work, as a laser beam can actualize the image implicit in the grooves 
of a hologram.
Recent developments in the philosophy of language lend unexpected 
confi rmation to the theory of criticism that is implied here. Modernist 
philosophy was based on the brilliant skepticism of the seventeenth century: 
Bacon’s, which resulted in empiricism, and Descartes’, which resulted in 
rationalism. It is beginning to look now as if even that skepticism itself 
was a presumptuous and implicitly metaphysical act of faith. The kind 
of certainty which that skepticism found so disappointingly absent in the 
traditional view of reality now appears meaningless and nonsensical, for 
instead of a world of objects and a world of knowledge about them (which 
should correspond) we now confront a world in which knowledge is another 
kind of object, and objects are made up of the knowledge other objects have 
of them.3 Descartes’ and Hume’s powerful critiques of empirical knowledge 
have been seconded by Karl Popper, who defi nes empirical knowledge, as 
such, as knowledge which is falsifi able (1959). We deal regularly in physics 
with events which would have been quite different had we come to know 
them in a different way (Heisenberg 1958). The neurological description of 
the brain as a damped, driven feedback system whose capacity for enormous 
variation resulting from miniscule differences in initial conditions, and 
whose active role in the construction of reality makes impartial objective 
observation impossible, is profoundly subversive to the requirements of 
empirical knowledge. The very complexity of the brain, with its ten to 
the billionth power possible brain states (Fraser 1980:153), exceeds the 
theoretical computing capacity of the rest of the physical universe; thus no 
objective check on the legitimacy of its activities could be carried out.
This is not to say that empirical knowledge, knowledge by experience 
and the evidence of the senses, is invalid. But its
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validity cannot be sought within itself: if we know something empirically, 
we cannot empirically know that we know it. Strangely enough, the same 
kind of problem arises even for rational knowledge, that inner sanctum of 
certainty to which Descartes retreated. I oversimplify, but I shall here take 
rational knowledge to be the same thing as logical truth, truth by defi nition, 
or analytic truth. An example is that a plane triangle contains 180 degrees in 
its interior angles. Another is that bachelors are unmarried. But the problem 
with rational knowledge is, as Gödel (1962) showed, that there is no system 
of axioms which is capable of proving the truth of its own axioms. Every 
system of logic rich enough to make meaningful propositions will contain 
a proposition of this form: “This statement is not provable”: a statement 
which is true but not provable, and which therefore distinguishes truth from 
provability within the system. One must leave the system in order to be 
able to assert the proposition’s truth. In doing philosophy in language, for 
instance, where do we stand when asked to give a defi nition of the word 
“defi nition”?–or of the word “refer”?
Thus the twin foundations of modern knowledge seem to be no 
longer foundations at all, but perhaps, like the seeming-solid planet earth 
itself, in free fall. What kind of knowledge can we believe in for sure? Is 
the “knowledge” model of language-use the most accurate one anyway? 
Suppose language-use were conceived less as a collection of cognitive 
propositions, and more as a set of actions?
The philosopher J. L. Austin (1962) identifi ed an interesting group 
of utterances which he characterized as “performative” statements, which 
are closely related to speech acts, in which the speaker performs an action 
by what he or she says, rather than states a belief or a piece of knowledge. 
Performative utterances rely neither on an unreliable correspondence with 
empirical fact, nor on the unreliable truth of a set of unprovable axioms. 
My own favorite example is the dealer in a poker game who stipulates 
that in the game she is dealing, red threes will be wild. Once she makes 
this statement, red threes are indeed wild; yet they are in no sense wild by 
defi nition (another dealer could choose one-eyed Jacks instead), nor would 
her statement yield to empirical falsifi cation. No player could check his hand 
and complain that he had a red three that happened not to be wild. A poker 
chip could conceivably fall upward, as a result of some extraordinary
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cosmological freak of gravity or quantum-statistical freak of probability; or 
a whole group of poker players might hallucinate it falling upwards. But the 
red three is wild.
In other words, performative truth can be more reliable than 
empirical or logical truth in certain situations. Those situations are often very 
important: though the stipulation of game-rules may be the purest example, 
promising and contract-making are also performative, as are marrying, 
legislating, religious invocations and sacraments, and perhaps even the 
scientifi c decision to base a system of measurement upon a particular type 
of question asked of the physical universe. An instance here is the stipulation 
of radioactive cesium decay as the basis of time measurement, replacing 
astronomical measures.
In what circumstances can a performative statement legitimately 
be made? First of all, there must be what I shall call a “performative 
community”: a universe of beings for whom a performative utterance shall be 
true. Performative truth pays for its certainty by giving up its claim to apply 
to entities outside its community. Secondly, the utterer must be empowered 
by that community to make the performative stipulation. Third, the 
performative utterance can stipulate reality only where previous legislation 
within the performative community and still in force is not declared to be 
in contradiction with it. These limitations introduce an intriguing feature of 
performative truths: they are always certain, but they can vary in strength 
and effectiveness, depending on the size of their performative community. 
To win and keep a large community, a performative must be in a relation 
with the past constitution of its universe that is parsimonious, consistent, 
coherent, powerful, predictive, and elegant–in a word, beautiful. Beauty is 
the fourth requirement of performative truth.
At this point we may see how empirical truth and logical truth fi nd 
a place within a broader framework of performatives which restores to 
them much of the legitimacy they have lost to rigorous twentieth-century 
analysis. (Ironic that Reason, inductive and deductive, must be rescued by 
an appeal to the fundamental principle underlying the medieval ideas of 
faith, authority, and revelation!) Empirical observation and experiment can 
now be seen not as an independent source of truth value, but as a way of 
enlarging the performative community so as to include not only persons but 
also non-personal and non-living organisms; and of establishing what kind 
of utterance can be true for them.
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Newton’s inverse square law of gravitation relied on the establishment of 
a performative community including the moon, the planets, apples, and 
dropping cannonballs, which had a language in common. In a sense it did not 
matter how the law itself was proposed: in any case it would have constituted 
a defi nition of space. Newton wished to keep space fl at and Euclidean: so 
he made the gravitational attraction proportional to the inverse square of the 
distance. Einstein, on the other hand, preferred to make the gravitational 
attraction constant and vary the curvature of space. Which explanation we 
choose depends fi nally on how beautiful–as already defi ned–the resulting 
universe game is.
Rational or logical truth also fi nds a place within the performative 
universe. When we state an axiom we are in fact making a performative 
utterance. “A straight line is the shortest distance between two points” 
cannot be tested for logical consistency with its axioms: it is an axiom. If we 
are in the performative community of the geometer, we accept his dictum 
here; and what persuades us to join and remain in that community is partly 
the beauty of the universe generated by that axiom. By their fruits, not their 
grounds, we shall judge them: for there are no grounds. The universe, our 
cosmologists tell us, began in chaos and nonexistence, so the fi nal ground 
of any appeal is utterly unreliable (Guth and Steinhardt 1984:128); and the 
world won its way to such consistency as it has through a long and bitter 
process of selection by consequences. In this light the American pragmatist 
tradition of philosophy is quite consistent with the performative view of 
truth: we make, or even make up, the truth and keep it if it works. William 
James’ conception of the “will to believe” (James 1979; see also Thayer 
1983), in which he defends ungrounded faith by arguing that it can bring 
about the reality it stipulates, is essentially a performative one.
Perhaps those quantum measurements of electrons, which force 
them to declare their position or energy, and the use of polarizing fi lters to 
make photons “make up their mind” which orientation they are vibrating in, 
are performative communications with nature. Indeed, there is an element in 
any coherent scientifi c experiment which consists of a declaration of ground-
rules, a delimitation of the region of signifi cant events. Though science is 
a process of questioning, it is scientists who decide what questions to ask 
(Kuhn 1962).
It should already be clear that there is a close relationship
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between performative utterance and performance in literature, in the oral 
tradition, and in ritual, human and even animal. Mating rituals among 
animals stipulate not previously existent beings (the “enemy” in the triumph 
ceremony) and bring into being a real entity, the pair bond, as well as a 
new individual of the species. At a Catholic mass, the bread and wine 
performatively are the body and blood of Christ (for the faithful, that is 
one of the things that the word “Christ” means, and they after all have a 
right to decide what a word means for them). When a storyteller says “Once 
upon a time” or “I sing of that man skilled in all ways of contending,” the 
subjunctive world is welded to this one and becomes part of it, yielding up 
its divine infantile indeterminacy as an electron does when it is measured. 
When a poet writes and an actor speaks the line, he “gives to airy nothing/A 
local habitation and a name” (A Midsummer Night’s Dream, V.i.16-17)—he 
performs new being into existence.
Toward the end of The Origin of Species Darwin permitted himself 
a metaphor–that of the branching tree of life, whose every twig was a 
species and whose branches represented ancient genera, families, classes, 
and kingdoms (1962:121). Freud, too, illustrated his theory of the psyche 
in society with a myth: that of the primal horde (1961:46-48). Socrates 
began the practice, perhaps, and it is originally on his authority that a sort of 
Gedankenexperiment or myth is offered here.
The function of the myth is to bring together the various perspectives 
explored in this essay: human evolution’s role in the development of the 
linguistic arts; ritual as the root of the oral tradition and ultimately of 
literature; the adaptation of brain chemistry, structure, and function to the 
forms and substance of those arts; their cultural universality; their essential 
nature as types of performance; and their philosophically performative 
validity. The myth is also intended to dispel any suspicion that the theory 
proposed here is a reductionist one–that is, behaviorally or biologically 
determinist. At the same time the myth rejects the opposite view, which has 
in fact cooperated with the reductionist view in preserving a sterile dualism: 
that is, the conception of literary art as sui generis, without connection with 
the vital history of our species. The myth also takes up anew the fertile 
Renaissance debate about the relationship between nature and art which 
was aborted in the seventeenth century by the rise of Reason, rational and 
empirical, and in the nineteenth by the
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romantic idea of Nature as innocent and unrefl exive; but the debate is now 
enriched by the greater effectiveness of our technology, by the collapse of 
epistemology and ontology in quantum theory, and by the full elaboration 
of the theory of evolution.
Once upon a time, then, there was a clever race of apes. Like many 
other species of higher animals, they possessed a sophisticated though 
instinctual system of vocal communication; they engaged in play activity 
when unoccupied; they possessed elaborate instinctual rituals, especially 
surrounding the functions of reproduction; their ranking system promoted 
wide variations in reproductive success; and like other higher primates they 
used rudimentary tools and passed their use down to the next generation by 
instruction as well as by genetic inheritance.
It took only one individual to combine these capacities in such a 
way that the Word became incarnate as a seed of culture and began to mold 
its host species into a suitable soil for it to fl ourish in. The competition 
for mates was intense, a competition which in other species had evolved 
structures as impractical as the antlers of the giant elk and the feathers of 
the peacock, and behaviors as contrary to survival as the mating dance of 
March hares or the courtship of the blue satin bowerbird. At the same time 
the border between play behavior and mating behavior was paper-thin. 
One individual, then, discovered that the desired mate responded favorably 
to playlike variation in the instinctual mating ritual: it was an improved 
lovesong that began the human race, for their mating ritual already involved 
a prominent vocal element.
This fi rst pair was imitated by others, and those which did so achieved 
greater reproductive success. They were in turn imitated by their young, 
which had inherited a slightly improved capacity to override the genetic 
hardwiring of their ritual inheritance by playlike variation on it. (This 
contrast between inherited norm and playlike variation will be preserved 
later in the general information processing system of human beings, where 
a regular carrier wave is systematically distorted to carry meaning; and 
specifi cally where a regular poetic meter is tensed against the rhythm of the 
spoken sentence, or musical meter is stretched or compacted by rubato, or 
even where visual symmetry is partly broken by the pleasing proportions of 
the golden section.)
Thus was born what we might call the Freedom and Dignity Game; 
for as it became elaborated, it developed vocal forms which,
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like the phantom opponent of the triumphal geese, had at the time no 
referents: Honor, Soul, Purpose, Good, Love, the Future, Freedom, Dignity, 
the Gods, and so on. But those vocal forms were performative utterances, 
and so for the performative community of the tribe those mysterious entities 
actually came into existence, in the fashion that the knight’s move in chess 
came into being by fi at. As if they were real all along, those abstract entities 
became independent sources of active determination, even though the 
medium of their being and of their continuity was no more than a communal 
convention. But after all, our bodily structures are maintained as realities 
not by themselves but by a mere arrangement of genes.
The ritual game indeed rapidly evolved. It developed cells of active 
refl exivity and self-criticism. Each generation altered it competitively, 
introducing new complexities: kinship classifi cation, decorative art, food 
taboos, hygiene, household conventions, law, storytelling, and all the rest. 
And in turn these complexities exerted irresistible selective pressure upon 
those wise apes. They developed an adolescence, with special hormones to 
promote rebellion against the traditional ritual. Infancy was protracted, to 
help develop and program the huge brain that was required to handle the 
complexities of the ritual, and lifespan was prolonged to accommodate the 
extra programming-time. A massive sexualization took place in the species, 
so that male and female were continuously in heat, females experienced 
orgasm like males, and they copulated face to face, thus transforming sex into 
a form of communication. The reward system of the brain was recalibrated to 
respond most powerfully to beauty, which is the quality which characterizes 
the ritual’s dynamic relationship of stability and increasing coherent 
complexity. Body decoration and clothing banished body hair. The hands 
turned into expressive instruments. The otolaryngeal system was elaborated 
into an exquisitely sensitive medium of communication and expression. The 
two sides of the brain became specialized, one for recognizing and holding 
an existing context in place, the other for acting upon it and transforming 
it in time. The indeterminacy of the world was lumped together into a new 
concept, the Future, which was carried by the dissonance between right 
brain pattern and left brain sequence. The Present was born, as the realm 
of the Act.
At a certain point in the Neolithic, the performative began to expand 
beyond the limits of the genus–which we may already recognize as Homo. 
Certain plants and animals–emmer,
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dogs–had joined the performative community in subordinate roles, their 
gene structures changing in response to the human ritual game. It was, in 
comparison with the fi ve million years the ritual had existed, but a moment 
before large regions of physics, chemistry, and biology had joined the human 
game and had been taught by scientifi c experimentation and instrumentation 
to speak the same language as we. Contemporary technology is the concrete 
continuation of the performative fi at with which we began.
But the moment that other, non-human entities began to join the 
game, the selective pressure it had exerted upon its performative community 
ceased, for the bookkeeping function which the game had relegated to the 
genes could now be taken up by our servants the plants, the animals, and 
the minerals. Reproductive success no longer depended on profi ciency in 
the game, and eventually there arose a celibate priesthood which entrusted 
its entire informational inheritance not to its genes but to the prosthetic 
seeds–semen, semantics–of music, writing, and the visual arts.
Our genetic inheritance, then, was frozen at the point it had reached 
in the Neolithic, and thus its fundamental grammar must be ours. For us 
to use the marvelous instrument of our brains properly we must fi nd that 
grammar out. And when we have done so we may be able to reinvigorate that 
pallid, decadent, and degenerate–but most direct–descendant of the Great 
Ritual, literature, with an infusion of the wild stock. We may do so partly 
by the mediation of the oral tradition, a healthy strain even in advanced 
technological culture, partly by breeding from our own performance and 
performative genres, and partly by hybridization with the ritual play of 
other cultures all over the world.
Nor will this work be only a recuperation, an attempt to recover in 
part what has been lost. Rather, it will represent a new phase of evolution in 
the Great Game, the phase in which it contemplates itself as a whole with the 
most meticulous scholarship, and directly guides its own development using 
what it has learned. In so doing it will have taken to itself the powers once 
allocated in hope and terror to uncontrolled deities which were neither kind 
nor humane, and will have begun to fulfi ll the promise of many religions, of 
the incarnation of the Word as reality rather than just as a seed. Nor need we 
fear that the process of the spirit will become tame and commonplace, for 
the more we know ourselves, the more radically the knower is thrust
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into the unfathomable mystery surrounding the cosmos, in the attempt to 
step back to get a better view. There is no confl ict between consciousness 
and spontaneity; it is only the consciousness which holds back from full 
commitment that is impotent.
What are the immediate consequences for literary criticism of the 
new theory of the word arts as it emerges?
First, perhaps, a dethroning of the text as the central locus of the act 
of literary art. Thus hermeneutics loses its specifi c relationship to literary 
studies and becomes a branch of the general process of analysis as it is 
used in the sciences, the social sciences, engineering, linguistics, and so on. 
Hermeneutics remains a useful but unprivileged technique among others 
in the study and appreciation of literature. But the emphasis will shift to 
literary performance; in non-oral literature, that performance is curiously 
divided between the writer and the reader, and the text that connects them 
fl oats in a limbo of potentiality. The interest that the text may possess as 
a complex structure in itself may be great, but it is of no different kind 
than the interest that a living cell, a complex polymer, or an atomic nucleus 
possesses. The interesting involution of structure may in fact have little 
to do with its actual value as a work of literary art: Finnegan’s Wake is 
surely more complicated, and a lesser work of art, than the Iliad; The Faerie 
Queene than King Lear. Instead of the text we shall be most interested, 
as literary folk, in the instantiation of the work in performance. One good 
sign that a person truly possesses a work of literature is that he remembers, 
without having consciously memorized them, large passages of the work, 
and that those passages occur to him at those moments in his life when they 
can make it more lucid and meaningful. The capacity to go through the 
work and do a hermeneutic or structural analysis of it may have nothing to 
do with this real possession of it.
An aspect of literary study which has been largely ignored by the 
theorists becomes important here: oral performance. One activity which 
really fastens a work of literature to a human life is reading it aloud, and 
learning to do that well may be more important than the technique of critical 
analysis (though good recitation will surely involve, as a subordinate activity, 
some analysis). Literary activity takes place largely in the classroom: there 
is no harm in this, but given our altered view of literature, the classroom 
situation appears in a new light. The classroom is to the literary ritual as the 
temple or shrine is to religious ritual,
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or as the theater is to drama. The place should ideally be festively and 
solemnly prepared, even if only by the respect shown to it that a member of 
a martial arts school will show to the practice-ground. The teacher should 
recognize that something of the probity of a priest and the charisma of the 
actor is required of him. The class should enter into the spirit of comedy 
when a comedy is the subject, and there should be in the classroom that 
slight touch of danger, of the possibility of personal transformation that one 
fi nds in real performances and ritual action. When Paulina in Shakespeare’s 
The Winter’s Tale, about to bring the statue to life, says “Those that think 
it is unlawful business I am about, let them depart,” the full force of that 
statement should be felt in the classroom as it should be in the theater. 
It ought to be dangerous to bring the dead to life; and the real drama is 
doing precisely that, by performative fi at, just as in the eucharist the bread 
performatively becomes the fl esh of Christ.
More, the reading of literature in the classroom ought to be explicitly 
related to the life values of the individuals present, and of the community 
as a whole. The performances of Aristophanes and Sophocles at the feast 
of Dionysus in Athens, which implicitly joined the debate about the 
Peloponnesian War, are models in this sense.
This is not to say that the other half of the performance–the writer’s 
own strange quiet frenzy over the page–should be ignored. A large part of 
literary study should be reconstructive, that is, it should most carefully enter 
the imaginative world of the author and reconstruct, with him, the work 
of literature as he composes it, just as a priest at a Mass will reenact the 
movements and words of Jesus as he broke the bread, or as the priest/actor 
in an Indonesian ritual drama will take on the role and actions of Hanuman 
the Monkey-God, or even as the Dalai Lama is all previous Dalai Lamas 
reincarnated. Standing where Shakespeare stands in the original composing 
and performing of The Tempest or where Woolf stands delivering A Room 
of One’s Own will do more to help us comprehend them than any amount 
of hermeneutics, though hermeneutics may be one way of helping us get to 
that place. But even the word “comprehend” is not entirely right. One does 
not necessarily “comprehend” one’s own eye or one’s own hand, and a great 
work of art can be as valuable, as intimate, an organ.
Another consequence of the new view of literature applies
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especially to us who are the heirs of modernism. Great literary art calls us 
back to the work of making ourselves human and remaking the world so 
that it more richly expresses itself. Religion, literature, legislation, science, 
and technological choice are all parts of the same world-constructing 
activity. We modernists, like angry, indolent, rebellious adolescents, have 
neglected that work for many decades, and have gone after anything which 
did not seem as if it might be of enduring human value. The result has 
been a systematic deprivation of the inner pleasures, those brain rewards 
that are associated with cosmogenesis. Perhaps, on a mythological level, 
we have turned to narcotics and to nuclear weapons for exactly the same 
reason: to provide by artifi cial means the sense of crucial value, value worth 
sacrifi cing for, that we gave up when we rejected the human ritual and the 
oral tradition. It is indeed part of our heritage that we should rebel, that we 
should alter the ritual, generation by generation. But the illumination occurs 
when both sides of the brain, so to speak–the innovative and the pattern-
holding–are mutually translated, when the new material of the world is 
grafted so cunningly with the old than the seam cannot be detected.4 
We are on the verge of a new classicism, what I shall call “natural 
classicism,” based upon the deep lexicon and syntax of human artistic nature 
as we are now coming to understand it. That new classicism, unlike the old, 
will not conceive of standards as an eternal and ideal perfection which can 
only asymptotically be approached, but rather as an aura, a mysterious and 
ghostly scaffold that precedes the growing edge, the concrescence of the 
world as it is performed into actual being. But there will be standards; and 
they will not be either relative or pluralist in their fundamental character, 
though they will be so richly generative that they will perhaps appear to 
exemplify pluralism and relativism. Consider the myriad musics, poetries, 
and paintings of the world’s cultures: how wholesome they are in the main; 
how recognizable they are, as human, to an anthropologically educated 
person; how they obey the deep laws of proportion, color, meter, and tone; 
and how they embody those essential human interests, in kinship, cookery, 
and the soul, yet how diverse they are. The new classicism will be a single 
house, but a house of many mansions. And it will be also a house which is 
growing, to which wings are continually being added; it will be hierarchical, 
but the hierarchy of its values and genres will not signify a static Chain of 
Being but a
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dynamic evolutionary tree of life.
One of the unifying principles in natural classicism will be the use 
of poetic meter as a way of breaking the monopoly of the left temporal lobe 
in literature. The new investigation and use of the integrative relationship 
between biological and mental life will involve a re-innervation of the 
limbic system, and even of the body as a whole, by the conscious cortex, 
and a re-innervation of left with right sides of the brain. We shall reach back 
to ancient technologies such as meter, as well as forward to the science 
of neurology and the technology of prosthesis, to accomplish this act of 
enlightenment. But we must recognize that like an athlete or an adept at 
meditation, a skilled reader of verse requires training and discipline: training 
and discipline of which our children have been increasingly deprived.
We shall, perhaps, reconcile ourselves to the fact that there is no 
substitute for plot and story in literary art. If our valuation of character, 
symbolism, imagery, theme, and imitative form replace our concern for the 
fundamental value of plot–if we dismiss story as having been exhausted–
then we have taken a step toward relinquishing that mastery over time 
which makes us peculiarly human. We know how to go on being a conscious 
person, how to construct a moral existence, how to win meaning from the 
fact of change, because we have stories that we can use as control-tests to 
sift out signifi cant variation in experience, and, even more important, to 
resonate with signifi cant constancies. Some writers, notably Deleuze and 
Guattari (1972), suggest that freedom consists in abandoning the coherence 
of self and of cosmos, and destroying the future as a signifi cant conception. 
Perhaps when we are no longer in danger of destroying the entire species 
by such attitudes we can try them out. Voluntary prefrontal lobotomy would 
be a good start, for it would abort our natural tendency to make sense of 
the world. Meanwhile, we need stories to keep us alive, as David Bynum 
(1978:27) puts it:
I know the chief use or function of fabulous narrative traditions 
everywhere is to make men adaptable in their minds, to enlarge the 
scope of their mental lives beyond the confi nes of their actual experience 
socially, psychically, and in every other way. I am so far persuaded of 
this that I have come to think of fabulous story-telling, and even of the 
stories so told in tradition, as proper aspects of human biology. . . .
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We shall rediscover the value of the genres, as embodying anciently-tested 
constellations of rules, whole syntaxes in themselves, tuned to the human 
nervous system. We will no longer dismiss as technological coincidence the 
independent rediscovery of epic, for instance, by the authors of Gilgamesh, 
the Iliad, the Mahabharata, the Heike; or of tragic drama by the Japanese, 
the Chinese, the Indonesians, the Greeks, and Aztecs. We shall perhaps, as 
literary folk, take up once again the responsibility for singing the world into 
being; and now our capacity to do this has been immensely strengthened 
by the scientifi c and technological enlargement of our performative 
community to include large areas of nature. An ontological criticism implies 
an ontological literary art: our stories will be histories, our metaphors will 
be concrete realities, our acting will be action.
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Notes
1I refer, of course, to Darwin’s study of the fl ora and fauna of the Galapagos Islands, 
especially the fi nches, which he undertook during the voyage of the Beagle and which demonstrated 
to him the effects of adaptation within a closed system.
2For instance, depending on whether we confi ne the term “human culture” to Homo erectus 
and beyond, or include the pithecines, Lancaster (1975:53) would date the “overlap” from either one 
or fi ve million years ago to about 12,000 years ago when the agricultural revolution began. Eccles 
(1979:94) estimates that the period extended from one million to 100,000 years ago. Hallowell (1961) 
proposes a protocultural stage of evolution, in which some but not all the cultural features of modern 
humanity were in place, well before the major expansion of the brain, among the early hominids. 
This could, according to some estimates, be as much as 25-50 million years ago. Sapir (1921) and 
De Laguna (1963) believe that language and thus, a fortiori, culture were co-original with tool use, 
which would give us a period of up to 15 million years. But Foster (1978) disagrees, placing the 
origin of language only 50,000 years ago. But she does not rule out the possibility of prelinguistic 
culture. Debetz (1961), the Soviet anthropologist, dates the origin of human culture to the origin of 
tool-making, rather than tool use, which might give us three million years. Wilson (1980) also argues 
that tool-making implies genuine human culture, and regards Homo habilis (1.9-3 million years ago) 
as fully human in this sense. Perhaps the clearest and most unambiguous description of the origin of 
distinctively human culture is Howell (1972). He asserts that the genus Homo is coterminous with 
human culture, which would give about 3-5 million years of overlap between the fi nal phases of 
human biological evolution and the early ages of cultural evolution.
3The history of this change is nicely charted in the evolution from Wittgenstein 1933 to 
1953.
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4See Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale, IV.4.72-103.
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